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B.: Witnesses--Personal Transactions With Persons Deceased At Time of
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
WITNESSES-PERSONAL TRANSACrI-ONS WITH PERSONS DECEASED AT

TIME OF TRIAL.-In an action of trespass on the case against the administrator of decedent for injuries alleged to have been inflicted on
P by decedent, P testified that she was shot while attempting to leave
decedent's home. Held, that the trial court erred in admitting the
testimony, as it was in violation of the dead man's statute. Clark
v. Douglas, 81 S.E.2d 112 (W. Va. 1954).
The dead man's statute, W. VA. CODE c. 57, art. 3, § 1 (Michie,
1949), reads in part: "No person offered as a witness . . . shall be
excluded by reason of his interest in the event ... or because he is
a party thereto, except as follows: . . . in regard to any personal
transaction or communication between such witness and a person
at the time of such examination, deceased, insane or lunatic ......
By abolishing the incompetency existing at common law on account
of interest in the event or action, it was intended to remove and not
create disabilities. Gilmer v. Baker, 24 W. Va. 72 (1883). But it
is becoming more a restriction to the introduction of evidence. As
stated in 1 Wi
gOR,EVIDENCE § 578 (1923), "Can it be more
important to save dead men's estates from false claims than to
save living men's estates from loss by lack of proof?"
The West Virginia court has given the words "personal transaction" a broad construction. Owens v. Owens's Adm'r, 14 W. Va.
88 (1878). As to what constitutes a personal transaction, the
tests of admissibility have been said to "include every method
whereby one person may derive impressions or information from
the conduct, condition, or language of another." Freeman v. Freeman, 71 W. Va. 307, 76 S.E. 657 (1912); In re Cristie's Estate, 167
Misc. 484, 4 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1938). It has also been described as "an
action participated in by witness and decedent, or something done
in decedent's presence, to which, if alive, he could testify of his
own personal knowledge." Freeman v. Freeman, supra; Myers v.
Phillips, 197 Ga. 536, 29 S.E.2d 700 (1944).
Many of the courts do not give "personal transaction" as broad
a meaning as the West Virginia court. In Seligman v. Orth, 205
Wis. 199, 236 N.W. 115 (1931), it was held that a party to a suit
can testify as to the actions and movements of the deceased preceding and subsequent to a motor accident, in an action by or
against the personal representative for damages arising out of the
accident. Contra: Willhide v. Biggs, 118 W. Va. 160, 188 S.E. 876
(1936); Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Davidson, 225 Ala. 171, 142
So. 63 (1932). It has been held that where the transaction is between
decedent and a third person even though the witness forms his
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impression by seeing the decedent perform the act, it is not a
"transaction" within the meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Simmons
v. Sisson, 26 N.Y. 264 (1863), cited in Owens v. Owens's Adm'r,
supra. But cf. Trombly v. Deso, 235 App. Div. 15, 256 N.Y. Supp.
225 (1932) (testimony that D and deceased were drinking ale preceding the accident excluded). In re Meyer's Estate, 163 Misc. 743,
297 N.Y. Supp. 605 (1937) (that initials on bag containing gold
were in writing of testatrix excluded); Gurski v. Sapowitch, 276
App. Div. 821, 93 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1949) (action of P in placing cedar
box and its contents in deceased's trunk to which P had no key
excluded). In In re Benso's Estate, 165 Kan. 709, 199 P.2d 523
(1948), it was held that testimony by a widow that her husband
had torn and burned an antenuptial contract in her presence was
not a transaction with the deceased, but referred to what the widow
had observed.
However, where the survivor is testifying, the following situations have been held inadmissible as "transactions" within similar
statutes: genuineness of handwriting of deceased based upon seeing
the decedent write, Johnson v. Bee, 84 W. Va. 532, 100 S.E. 486
(1919); work done by P for D's decedent, Owens v. Owens's Adm'r,
supra; a beating allegedly administered by a sheriff and his deputies
to the decedent, Maciejczak v. Bartell, 187 Wash. 113, 60 P.2d 31
(1936); widow's testimony as to insured's physical condition during
period antedating his discharge, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Prater's
Adm'x, 259 Ky. 665, 83 S.W.2d 17 (1935); that husband was on
fire, Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 289 Ky. 249, 158 S.W.2d 427
(1942); resumption of marital relations between husband and wife
after execution of separation agreement, Smith v. Smith, 187 Ga.
743, 2 S.E.2d 417 (1939); alleged common law marriage, Catlett v.
Chestnut, 107 Fla. 498, 146 So. 241 (1933); that P was a child of
decedent, Crumley v. Worden, 200 Ill. 105, 66 N.E. 318 (1903).
For a suggested legislative revision of the existing dead man's
statute in West Virginia, see Donley and Funt, Personal Transactions with Persons Deceased at Time of Trial-An Analysis of
Cases and a Suggestion for Statutory Change, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 256
(1935).
A. J. B.
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